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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V

V .

VICTOR RIOS,

Case No. 20090862

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
VICTOR RIOS, by and through his attorney of record contends that he has made a
valid claim which may be addressed by this Court under the plain error standard.
Secondly, he claims that this Court may address the constitutionality of the burglary
statute, also under the plain error standard.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DEFENDANT HAS MET HIS CLAIM UNDER
A PLAIN ERROR ANALYSIS

The state contends that "nothing in the statute requires that the actor form his
felonious intent before he unlawfully remains on the premises" and it cites State v.
Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998), as authority for this position. In fact, the state says
that Rudolph easily disposes of the defendant's claims. Aplnt's Br. at 16-17.

In Rudolph, the defendant broke into the victim's home through a basement
window. Rudolph. 970 P.2d at 1224. She returned home to find him standing there with a
knife in his hand. Id. He punched her and pushed her onto the couch and later forced her
at knife point to perform oral sex on him in the shower. Id. He also raped her. Id. The
victim was able to dial 911 and was rescued by police. Id. at 1224-25. On appeal for the
first time, the defendant objected to a use of the "remains unlawfully" provision of the
burglary statute, arguing that it should only apply if the defendant lawfully entered the
property. Id. at 1225.
The Supreme Court held that lawfulness of the initial entry is not critical for a
defendant to be convicted of burglary under the "remains unlawfully" provision. Id. at
1229. The statute, it held, fails to make a distinction between lawful and unlawful entries.
Id.
Rudolph nevertheless argues that our interpretation of the "remaining unlawfully"
provision is incorrect because it was included in our burglary statute for the
purpose of reaching those cases where the actor initially enters a building lawfully
but then remains there after his or her right to do so has expired for purposes of
committing a crime. While this may be true, it does not necessarily follow that the
"remaining unlawfully" provision is confined to those situations where the initial
entry was lawful. We believe that such an interpretation would create an
anomalous result. For instance, under Rudolph's interpretation of the statute, one
who enters lawfully but then remains unlawfully and forms the intent to commit
another felony, theft, or assault is guilty of burglary while one who enters
unlawfully and thereafter forms that same intent is guilty only of trespass. We are
unable to see the distinction between the two scenarios. In our view, the actor in
the second scenario is at least as dangerous and culpable as the actor in the first.
Therefore, we are not satisfied that our legislature intended such a result when it
enacted our current burglary statute.
Id. (emphasis added). The court then added:
2

Rudolph further argues that applying the "remaining unlawfully" provision to all
situations, regardless of the lawfulness of the entry, will lead to a slippery slope,
making all crimes committed inside a building a burglary. The flaw in this
argument, however, is that even under our interpretation, the actor must commit or
form the intent to commit another crime at the time he enters or while he
remains unlawfully in the building. In other word^;, if the actor commits a crime
while lawfully inside a building, there is no burglary. Thus, contrary to Rudolph's
argument, not all crimes committed in buildings will constitute burglary under our
construction of the "remaining unlawfully" provision of the burglary statute.
In conclusion, we hold that a person is guilty of bdrglary under section 76-6202(1) if he forms the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault at the time he
unlawfully enters a building or at any time thereafter while he continues to remain
there unlawfully.
id. See also. State v. Garcia, 2010 UT App 196,5 13,201|0 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 ("Thus,
the plain language of the statute requires that the actor's intent be formed at the time of
entry or at any time while the actor remains unlawfully ip the building or dwelling."
(emphasis added)).
Quite contrary to the State's claims, Rudolph actually supports the arguments
made by the defendant. According to Rudolph, a person may be guilty of burglary for
"unlawfully remaining" in two scenarios: 1) he unlawfully enters a dwelling, remains
unlawfully, and then forms the intent to commit the crime; 2) he lawfully enters the
building, remains unlawfully and then forms the intent to commit a new crime. As the
Supreme Court highlighted, a person would not be guilty of a burglary if he is lawfully in
a dwelling. There is a key to both interpretations: the defendant must, at some point,
remain unlawfully. How this provision is defined becomes key to Mr. Rios's claims.
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Under the state's reading of the statute, any crime committed in a dwelling would
constitute a burglary—a completely anomalous result. The defendant must do something
beyond commission of the crime to render his presence unlawful.
The plain error standard requires the defendant to show that 1) an error exists, 2)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court and 3) the error was harmful. State v.
Hoi gate. 2000 UT 74,5 13, 10 P.3d 346. The trial court has an obligation to ensure the
case submitted to the jury is coupled by sufficient evidence to convict, so long as the
insufficiency is "obvious and fundamental." State v. Diaz. 2002 UT App 288,JJ 32,55
P.3d 1131.
It is clear in this case that the agreed-upon, marshaled facts cannot support an
finding that Mr. Rios "form[ed ] the intent to commit another crime ... while he
remain[ed] unlawfully." Taking the facts with every inference granted to the state we
have the following: 1) Mr. Rios knocked on Ms. VanDyke's door and asked for a joint. 2)
Ms. VanDyke said that she had cigarettes and went in to get them. 3) She turned around
and Mr. Rios stood right by her holding out two dollars. 4) She told him that she did not
want the money; she handed him the cigarettes and asked him to leave. 5) He
"meandered" toward the door. 6) He turned around in the door casing. 6) Ms. VanDyke
told him to "get out" and shoved him. 7) Mr. Rios assaulted Ms. VanDyke.
What must be clear, from the facts presented, are facts from which a reasonable
jury could infer that Mr. Rios formed the intent to commit an assault "while he
4

remain[ed] unlawfully." There are no facts from which this inference can be made. The
defendant did not say, "If you ask me to leave, I'll hit you", so direct evidence of his
intent is missing. But circumstantial evidence of Mr. Rios's forming an intent to commit
a crime "while" unlawfully remaining is also lacking. He did not manifest any sort of
violent behavior prior to Ms. VanDyke's shove. In fact, he was cooperative and
agreeable. He handed her money for the cigarettes. He "nteandered" toward the door as
soon as Ms. VanDyke asked him to leave.
The only fact from which anything could be inferred is the fact that Mr. Rios
turned around in the door casing. One might be able to infer from this fact that Mr. Rios
wished to stay, although even this inference is a stretch. By most accounts, Mr. Rios
appeared to be intoxicated and it seems more likely that he did not fully understand what
he was doing. But, one clearly cannot infer from this fact that Mr. Rios intended to
assault Ms. VanDyke—a critical fact which the State neglects to address. Not one single
fact from the entire encounter justifies an inference that Mr. Rios formed the intent to
commit the assault "while he remainfed] unlawfully", whjch is the test formulated by the
Court in Rudolph. In fact, the only inference justified by Mr. Rios's turn is that he
intended to stay in her apartment. This fact could certainly justify a finding that Mr. Rios
trespassed in Ms. VanDyke's residence. But for a burglary where one remains
unlawfully, the basis underlying a trespass cannot be used as justification to show intent
to commit a different crime (other than the trespass). There must be other evidence
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justifying a conclusion that he formed an intent to commit a different crime, "while" he
was there.
As discussed later in this reply, burglary is a different sort of offense. The mere
commission of a crime in a residence does not constitute a burglary. A defendant must do
something more—he must remain unlawfully with a purpose to commit a different
offense. The classic example of this would be a person who hides in a store until after
closing in order to steal an item. He would be guilty of burglary because he, 1) remained
unlawfully, and 2) formed the intent to commit another offense.
This critical evidence was lacking. As such, it was a fundamentally harmful
error—it affected the element of the offense. The trial court erred in submitting this case
to the jury because it should have been obvious to the court that an element of the State's
case was not met. The plain error standard has been met by the defendant.
IL

THIS COURT MAY INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
BURGLARY STATUTE, A POSITION UNADDRESSED BY THE STATE
A defendant "could raise [a constitutional] challenge [to a statute] for the first time

on appeal by arguing plain error." State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,5 28, n.2,97 P.3d
732 (Bench, Orme, concurring). See, United States v. Knowles. 29 F.3d 947, 950-51 (5th
Cir. 1994) (failure to challenge constitutionality of criminal statute in district court
confines appellate court's review to "a search for plain error"). See also State v. Blubach,
904 P.2d 688,700-01 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("However, defendant did not challenge the
6

constitutionality of the statute at trial, nor has he argued plain error or exceptional
circumstances on appeal."); State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 903 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
("In the instant case, defendant... did not challenge ... the constitutionality of the ...
statute before the trial court. Therefore, absent plain error or exceptional circumstances,
defendant will not now be heard to complain ... that the gang enhancement statute is
unconstitutional.")
Additionally, this case calls for statutory interpretation. "Statutory interpretation
presents a question of law; therefore, we review the trial court's rulings for correctness
and give no deference to its conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992);
see also State v. Keppler. 1999 UT App 89,5 4,976 P.2d 99." State v. Casey, 2001 UT
App 205,5 6,29 P.3d 25 (internal quotation omitted). While the defendant did not
preserve these issues at trial, he argues that this Court may interpret the meaning of the
statute and its constitutionality under the plain error standard.
He contends that this court has jurisdiction to address whether it was plain error
for the court to instruct the jury that a person "remains unlawfully" for a burglary charge
without including the element of surreptitiousness. The position is supported extensively
by the English common law, the Model Penal Code and Utah common law as detailed in
defendant's initial brief. The state, in its response, failed to address even one point from
the defendant's arguments on this issue.
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Defendant contends that the term "remains unlawfully" implicitly requires an
element of surreptitiousness. First, as stated in Rudolph and Garcia, in order to be
convicted under the "remains unlawfully" provision of the statute, he must form the
intent "while" he remains unlawfully. Implicit in this test is the idea that the burglar must
first remain unlawfully, then he must form the intent to commit another crime. Otherwise,
consider the following anomalous situation. A person is standing in his yard with his
friend. They get into an argument. He asks her to leave. She slaps him. She is guilty of
assault and probably trespass. A person sits with his friend in his front room. They get
into an argument. He asks her to leave. She slaps him. She is guilty of assault, trespass
and burglary. Imagine this scenario: a person is sitting in the front room with his friend.
They get into an argument. He asks her to leave. She walks out. She stands in the
doorway. He pushes her out. She slaps him. She is guilty of assault, trespass and
burglary. This latter situation mirrors Mr. Rios's case exactly. His guilt of burglary
depends entirely on whether he was mere inches closer to the room or mere inches
outside of the room. Had Mr. Rios been one step back, he would only be guilty of assault
and trespass and not burglary.
The law cannot render such a serious degree of difference for a mere step. In one
case, he is guilty of misdemeanors (and depending on the level of assault, a potential
felony) and in the other, he is guilty of a first degree felony. Merely adding the assault to
a dwelling cannot reach the result in this case. There must be something more for a
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person to be convicted of remaining unlawfully. The following discussion from the New
York courts is instructive:
At common law, burglary was defined "as the breaking and entering of a dwelling
of another, at night, with intent to commit a felony therein." (Hechtman, Practice
Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law art. 140, at 5
[1975].) Unless the intent to commit a felony existed at the time of the breaking
and entry, there was no burglary. Similarly, under the former Penal Law, a
defendant who broke and entered with no intent to commit a crime was not guilty
of burglary, though later deciding to commit a crime on the premises (People v.
Haupt, 247 N.Y. 369, 371, 160 N.E. 643).
When the Penal Law was revised in 1965, burglarV in the third degree was
defined as "knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to
commit a crime therein." (Penal Law § 140.20; emphasis added.) The People's
contention in essence is that the addition of "remains unlawfully "~a concept
unknown at common law or in the former Penal Law ~ abrogates the requirement
of intent to commit a crime at the time of unlawful entry. All that is now required,
according to the People, is that defendant commit d.crime while unlawfully on the
premises. On its face, the statute could be read to support this interpretation.
This interpretation is, however, not consistent witlj the purpose of classifying
burglary as a separate and relatively more serious crime. As commentators have
pointed out, burglary is in fact a form of attempt crime , since the crime the
unlawful intruder intended to commit need not be qompleted. The development of
burglary as an independent felony resulted from two deficiencies in the early law
of attempt: that an attempt could not be penalized ijntil the last act short of
completion had occurred, and that the conduct was in any event punishable only as
a misdemeanor (see, Denzer and McQuillan, Practice Commentary, McKinney's
Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law art. 140, 331-332 [19671; Model Penal
Code and Commentaries, Official Draft and Revise|d Comments §221.1, at 6263).
These gaps in the laws of attempt have now been remedied. An attempt need not
encompass the final act toward the completion of the offense (People v. Bracey,
41 N.Y .2d 296, 300, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094), and is punishable as an
offense of the same grade or a single lesser grade oj severity as the completed
crime (Penal Law § 110.05). Nonetheless, the Legislature has continued to
penalize burglary as a serious felony-rather than simply punish the trespass and
the attempted or consummated crime within a builqing-because of the heightened
danger posed when an unlawful intrusion into a building is effected by someone
9

bent on a criminal end. A defendant who simply trespasses with no intent to
commit a crime inside a building does not possess the more culpable mental state
that justifies punishment as a burglar.
We conclude, therefore, that the Legislature had no such purpose. The statute
contains no clear and explicit direction to change the long-standing rule (see,
People v. King, 61 N.Y .2d 550,554,475 N.Y .S .2d 260,463 N.E.2d 601). To the
contrary, the Legislature was plainly addressing a different factual situation-not
one of unlawful entry but of unauthorized remaining in a building after lawful
entry (as a shoplifter who remains on store premises after closing). As we
observed in People v. Licata, 28 N.Y .2d 113, 320 N.Y.S.2d 53,268 N.E.2d 787,"
'[t]he word "remain" in the phrase "enter or remain" is designed to be applicable to
cases in which a person enters with "license or privilege" but remains on the
premises after termination of such license or privilege.1" (Id., at 117, 320 N.Y.S.2d
53,268 N.E.2d 787, quoting Denzer and McQuillan, Practice Commentary, op.
cit., at 341-342; 2 CJI [N.Y.] PL 140.20; 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal
Law § 8.13[b], at 468.) By the words "remains unlawfully" the Legislature sought
to broaden the definition of criminal trespass, not to eliminate the requirement that
the act constituting criminal trespass be accompanied by contemporaneous intent
to commit a crime.
In order to be guilty of burglary for unlawful remaining, a defendant must have
entered legally, but remain for the purpose of committing a crime after
authorization to be on the premises terminates. And in order to be guilty of
burglary for unlawful entry, a defendant must have had the intent to commit a
crime at the time of entry. In either event, contemporaneous intent is required.
People v.Gaines. 74 N.Y .2d 358; 546 N.E.2d 913 (N.Y. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
This discussion by the Alaska courts is also instructive:
Under AS 11.46.310(a), a person commits burglary if the person "enters or
remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime in the building".
"Remains" ... is a word that normally suggests continuing conduct. But in Shetters
v. State, this court rejected the contention that a person "remains unlawfully" in a
building whenever the person steals property from the building. Instead, we
clarified that even though a defendant unlawfully remains in a building and
thereafter commits a crime in the building, the defendant will have committed a
burglary only if they had the intent to steal at the time their presence first became a
trespass:
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If [a defendant doesl not have an intent to steal at the time his presence on
the premises first [becomes] unlawful, he [can] not be convicted of
burglary. The intent to commit a further crime must co-exist with the initial
criminal trespassf.]
Shetters,751 P.2dat36n.2.
Thus, for purposes of the burglary statute, the defendant's act of unlawfully
"remaining" is not continuing conduct. [T]he word "remains" in the burglary
statute refers to a particular point in time: the time when the defendant's privilege
to be in a building expires and the defendant must decide whether to leave or stay.
If the defendant decides to stay, the defendant "regains unlawfully". If, at that
time, the defendant has the intent to commit a crimp in the building, then the
defendant has committed burglary. But if the defendant remains unlawfully in the
building with no intent to commit a crime, and does not form the intent to commit
a crime until later, there is no burglary. In this context, "remains" does not refer to
a continuing action.
Saathoff v.Alaska, 991 P.2d 1280,1285-86 (Alaska App. 1999).
The final, instructive discussion, comes from the Supreme Court of Hawai'i:
In order to be convicted of the offense of burglary, the perpetrator must
"intentionally [enter] or [remain] unlawfully in a bMlding, with intent to commit
therein a crime against a person or against property rights." The Hawai'i Penal
Code's definition of burglary was adopted from the Model Penal Code. The
commentary to the Model Penal Code discusses th^ evolution of the offense of
burglary as follows:
The initial development of the offense of burglary, as well as much of the
later expansion of the offense, probably resulted from an effort to
compensate for defects of the traditional law of attempt. The common law
of attempt ordinarily did not reach a person who embarked on a course of
criminal behavior unless he came very close to his goal.... Under that view
of the law of attempt, a person apprehended while breaking into a dwelling
with intent to commit a felony therein would not have committed an
attempt, for he would not have arrived at th^ scene of his projected theft,
rape, or murder. . . . The development and expansion of the offense of
burglary provided a partial solution to these problems. Making entry with
criminal intent an independent substantive offense carrying serious
sanctions moved back the moment when the law could intervene in a
criminal design and authorized penalties more nearly in accord with the
11

seriousness of the actor's conduct. Since every burglary is by hypothesis an
attempt to commit some other crime, it is appropriate to consider the
sanction for the completed offense that is the objective of the burglary in
evaluating the propriety of the sentence that is authorized for the burglary
itself.
Model Penal Code § 221.1 (1985) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to the commentary to the Model Penal Code, the elements of the offense
of burglary are established at the moment that an unlawful entry or "remaining"
with the requisite criminal intent is made. It would be an unwarranted extension of
Hawai'i's modern burglary statute to expand the offense of burglary to include
situations in which the criminal intent develops after an unlawful entry or
remaining has occurred. See State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290,552 P.2d 451,452
(Ariz. 1976) ("burglary may be distinguished from the crime of theft and
shoplifting in that the intent to commit a theft or any felony must be formed at the
time of entry") (emphasis added).
The Model Penal Code defines burglary, in pertinent part, as follows: "A person is
guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure . .. with purpose to
commit a crime therein[.]" In adopting the Model Penal Code, the Hawai'i
legislature made two changes that must be addressed herein. First, the Hawai'i
Penal Code provides that a person commits the offense of burglary if the person
"intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building." Second, the person must
have an "intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against property
rights." Our interpretation of the legislative intent behind these changes is that the
legislature did not intend to alter the Model Penal Code's requirement that an
intent to commit an offense exist at the time of the unlawful entry or "remaining."
We have not previously addressed the meaning of "unlawfully remain" in the
context of the burglary statute. We interpret this language, as have other courts
that have addressed similar language, as being inserted to cover situations in
which the initial entry was lawful, but the presence later becomes unlawful and the
perpetrator remains with the intent to commit a crime.
In People v. Hutchinson, 124 Misc. 2d 487,477 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1984),
the Supreme Court of New York, Bronx County, held that, if a criminal defendant
entered with true consent, his subsequent commission of a criminal act could not
in and of itself convert a lawful entry into an unlawful remaining sufficient to
sustain a burglary charge. The Hutchinson court held that "criminal liability for
unlawfully remaining is designed to apply to situations in which a person enters
with genuine license and privilege but remains after the termination of the license
12

or privilege." 477 N.Y.S.2d at 967. In rejecting thel prosecution's argument that the
commission of a criminal act was enough to uphol<|i a conviction for burglary even
if the initial entry was lawful, the court held that
this reasoning impermissibly broadens the scope of liability for burglary,
making a burglar of anyone who commits a 'crime on someone else's
premises. It erroneously merges two separat^ and independent elements that
must coexist to establish burglary: First, the trespassory element of entry or
remaining without license or privilege; Secdnd, intent to commit a crime.
Id.
Other jurisdictions that have considered the meanirig of the term "remains
unlawfully" have reached the same interpretation as the New York courts. In
Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), the court addressed the
statutory "remains unlawfully" language as follows
The commentary to [the Alaska burglary statute] explains that the "word
'remain' in the phrase 'enter or remain unlawfully' is also designed to apply
to cases in which a person enters with a 'license or privilege' but remains on
the premises after his license or privilege has terminated." Thus, the
provision is intended to cover situations in which a person is privileged to
enter a closed building but remains in the building after the privilege has
expired; likewise, it applies to the situation where a person enters a building
when it is open to the public but remains aftqr the building has closed.
699 P.2d at 894. 5
The general rule is that "penal statutes are to be stricttly construed." State v. Ganal,
81 Haw. 358, 373,917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996) (citatidn omitted). We adopt the
formulation of "remains unlawfully" as interpreted by the courts of Alaska and
New York, cited supra. A perpetrator "remains unlawfully" for the purposes of a
burglary prosecution only in situations in which the individual makes an initial
lawful entry, that subsequently becomes unlawful.
State v. Mahoe. 972 P.2d 287,288-90 (Haw. 1998).
Defendant contended, in his opening brief, that the cjommon law of England, the
United States, and Utah, supports a reading of "remains unlawfully" as requiring an
element of surreptitiousness. This reading squarely fits within the larger definition of
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burglary as a more serious offense. Additionally, Mr. Rios also cites these cases for a
somewhat related proposition—that a person cannot, under the law, "unlawfully remain"
unless he forms the intent to commit a different crime, at the time he decides to
unlawfully remain. When a person no longer has an authorization to stay on the premises,
he must remain unlawfully with one purpose in mind: to commit a crime on the premises.
This purpose, as Saathoff explains, must exist at the time he remains unlawfully. In other
words, in Mr. Rios's case, at the time Ms. VanDyke asked him to leave, he had to have
the intent to remain unlawfully and to commit another crime while he was on the
premises. That definition fits squarely within the plain language of the statute and with
the common law of burglary. To ensure a conviction for burglary for "remaining
unlawfully" the state must show, 1) that the person had some attempt to surreptitiously,
2) commit some other crime on the premises.
Neither of these requirements were met in this case. At no point did Mr. Rios
attempt to commit anything like a burglary. He did not "break" or "enter" the property.
He never secreted himself or tried to hide. He did not remain beyond Ms. VanDyke's
permission with the intention of committing a crime on the property. Because of these
failures, the State was unable to prove Mr. Rios's commission of a burglary under the
law.
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1. The "Remains Unlawfully" Provision, if Construed fo Apply in this Scenario.
Violates Equal Protection under the United States and Utah Constitutions
Additionally, defendant contends that the "remaining unlawfully" portion of the
statute is unconstitutional, in that it violates the equal protection clauses of both the
United States and Utah Constitutions. "Central to the guarantee of equal protection under
the law is the notion that if a law has the effect of treating differently classes of people
subject to the law, the government must adequately justify its disparate treatment. E.g.,
State v. Merrill. 2005 UT 34,5 31, 114 P.3d 585." State v. Williams, 2007 UT 98,5 8,
175 P.3d 1029. "We have, however, determined that article I, section 24 of the Utah
Constitution, while embodying the same general principles as the United States
Constitution, may, under certain circumstances, provide different and greater protection
of individual rights. See State v. Merrill. 2005 UT 34,5JJ 31, 33-34,44 n.4, 114 P.3d
585."
Id. at 5 20. See also, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const, art. I, § 24. Operational
uniformity, in turn, requires that persons similarly sijuated be treated similarly.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,670 (Utah 1984). We have adopted a two-part test
to measure whether a statute meets this standard: "First, a law must apply equally
to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and the different
treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objective of the statute." Id. (citations omitted); accord
Schofield, 2002 UT 132 at P12; State v. Mohi, 901 R2d 991,997 (Utah 1995);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,637 (Utah 1989).
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The first component of our assessment model presupposes that the statute creates
classifications, casting its net over some persons based on their status or conduct
while excluding others. We long ago noted that the creation of classes and the
discrimination among them is inherent to all laws:
"Every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory. The Legislature cannot
in one act legislate as to all persons or all subject matters. It is inclusive as
to some class or group and as to some human relationships, transactions, or
functions and exclusive as to the remainder. For that reason, to be
unconstitutional the discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A
classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion
features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between
classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its
operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the
purposes to be accomplished by the act."
Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 n.6 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Mason.
94 Utah 501,507,78 P.2d 920,923 (Utah 1938)).
Merrill. 2005 UT 34,55 33-34.
The burglary statute must apply to similarly situated persons equally. In the
criminal context, the statute must treat all similarly situated defendants the same. The
"remains unlawfully" section of the burglary statute cannot pass such a test. A person
who commits an aggravated assault in a person's yard, or a mere two inches outside her
door, would not be guilty of burglary, under the State's reading of the statute. However, a
person who commits the assault inside the home would be charged with a separate, and
significantly more serious, offense. The conduct would not be different: all three would
be people who committed a serious crime on the property of another. Yet, the one in the
house would face a first-degree felony, while the other two would face third-degree
felonies for the assaults, but not the burglary charge. This is clearly not a law that
"applfies] equally to all persons within a class" and is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary.
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Merrill. 2005 UT 34,534. However, if the court were to r^ad surreptitiousness into the
statute, then the arbitrariness would be eliminated. All persons who "remain unlawfully"
in a building surreptitiously and who form the intent to cdmmit a separate crime therein,
would be guilty of burglary. This clearly covers the common law basis for burglary and
clarifies those situations which burglary was meant to coyer: a person is lawfully on a
premises, but remains surreptitiously after that is revoked in order to commit a further
crime. This eliminates the problem of charging those whol commit crimes in a dwelling
from also being charged with burglary in a situation like Mr. Rios's, in which the
corresponding conduct fails to meet the burglary requirements.
The underlying basis for Mr. Rios's Utah law arguibent was argued and detailed at
length in his opening brief. In short, he contends that Utah 's construction of its burglary
statute follows that of the common law definition of burglary, which required the burglar
to engage in some sort of "breaking" or surreptitious conduct. Utah's unique history and
its equal protection clause justify providing greater protections to defendants.
Accordingly, this court should find that the "remains unlawfully" provision of the
burglary statute violates the equal protection clauses of boih Constitutions unless an
element of surreptitiousness were included in the statute.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court should fiiid plain error. Defendant has
demonstrated the error in the burglary statute and that it w^s harmful—there is a clear
equal protection violation. This error should have been obyious to the trial court, who
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allowed Mr. Rios to be convicted of burglary in a situation which clearly violates equal
protection. Similarly situated individuals (persons who commit assaults on others'
property) are not treated equally under the statute.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse Mr. Rios's conviction for
aggravated burglary.
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